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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS
Nelson v. Miller
11 IIll. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957)
An employee of the defendant, a Wisconsin resident dealing in
appliances, was alleged to have negligently injured the plaintiff while
unloading a stove in Illinois. Suit was commenced in Illinois, the de-
fendant being served personally in Wisconsin pursuant to an Illinois
statute which granted jurisdiction in any cause of action arising from
Ccthe commission of a tortious act within the State" by any person.1 The
defendant moved to quash the summons on the grounds that the statute
contravened both the United States and the Illinois constitutions. The
Illinois court, however, upheld the statute and the service stating that
"the requirements of due process of law have been met."
Under the traditional concept of constitutional due process, the
individual states have been restricted from exercising judicial jurisdiction
over persons or property located in another state.2 By statute, Illinois
challenged this tradition and sought to reach certain persons beyond its
borders. The principal case presented the question as to whether this due
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by a state
exercising in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-corporate de-
fendant in an action arising from a single tortious act committed -vithin
the state.' The Illinois court in upholding this statute has permitted an
extension into the constitutionally permissible field of state court juris-
diction not heretofore attempted.
Historically, the permitted jurisdiction of the courts was based upon
IILL. REv. STAT. C. 110, §17 (1955) reads as follows:
"1 Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts herein-
after enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an indi-
vidual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of
any of said acts:
a) The transaction of any business within this State;
b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situ-
ated in this State;
d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting.
"2 Service of process . . . may be made by personally serving
the summons upon the defendant outside this State, . . ."
2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (1865) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733
(1878). A similar result has been reached in England without the compulsion of
a written constitution. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (1808) ; Schibsby v. West-
enholz L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
3 A further due process requirement, not discussed within this note, is the
requirement that the defendant receive adequate notice of the claim against him.
See Mullane v. Central Ifanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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their de facto power over the person of the defendant. Service of process
within the jurisdiction of the court was necessary, in absence of actual
consent, to render a judgment personally binding upon him.4 However,
increasing interstate activity provided situations where it was expedient
to depart from this strict interpretation and courts responded by forcing
novel concepts of jurisdiction into the language of established frame-
works.' These fictive justifications were resorted to in order to subject
defendants to a court's jurisdiction where fairness required it.
An excellent example of the facility of courts to build a new idea
on the foundation of an old concept is shown with their treatment of
the foreign corporation.' It was difficult to say that a foreign corpo-
ration was physically "present" in the same sense that an individual was
present. However, since a state could require consent to judicial juris-
diction as a condition for doing business within the state, the courts felt
equally justified in implying a consent from the mere fact of doing busi-
ness.' Thus, a foreign corporation could be subject to the jurisdiction of
a state whether it expressly consented through qualifying to do 'business
or impliedly consented by doing business without such qualification.
Non-resident individuals also were affected by this expansion of in
personam jurisdiction. A non-resident individual doing business in Iowa
was held amenable to Iowa's jurisdiction in a cause of action arising
from a securities business which was regulated by a statute requiring
registration and consent to service as a condition of selling securities in
the state.' Non-resident motorists were held to have impliedly consented
to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state by use of its highways and to
have assented to the appointment of the State Registrar as agent to re-
ceive service of process.' This extension was occasioned by the great
social impact created by the advent of the automobile and its highly
dangerous potential.
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 1.
5Language of the non-resident motorist statutes was typified by the Massa-
chusetts statute which declared that operation of a motor vehicle on the public
ways of that state "shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process
against him which shall be so served (upon the State Registrar) shall be of the
same legal force and validity as if served upon him personally." MASS. ANN.
LAWS c. 90, as amended by Statute 1923 c. 431, §2.
The language of the courts in dealing with foreign corporations was that
"when this corporation sent its agent into Ohio with authority to make contracts
of insurance there, the corporation must be taken to assent to the condition upon
which alone such business could be transacted by them; that condition being that
an agent, to make contracts should also be the agent of the corporation to receive
service of process in suits on such contracts." Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59
U.S. 404, 408 (1855).
6 For a treatment of jurisdiction over foreign corporations see, note, Foreign
Corporations-State Boundaries for National Business, 59 YALE L.J. 737 (1950).
7 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, supra note 5.
8 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294- U.S. 623 (1935).
9 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 552 (1927).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
These were the major inroads made on the traditional due process
concept until the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington ° was
decided. Due process was held, by that court, to require only that the
non-resident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum
such that the maintenance of the suit in that state does not offend the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." The decision
involved a corporate defendant but the court in the principal case held
it to be "clear that the general principle underlying the decision applies
equally to jurisdiction over non-resident individuals.""
Subsequent to the International Shoe case much legislation was en-
acted attempting to extend the in personam jurisdiction of state courts.
The non-resident motorist statutes were extended to watercraft.'"
Jurisdiction over non-resident, unincorporated associations was upheld as
to causes of action arising from activities within the state.' 3 A single
tort was held to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of due process in
an action against a foreign corporation not doing business in Vermont' 4
but the question of whether the state had the power to subject a non-
resident individual to a suit arising out of a single tort, not resulting from
highly dangerous activity, remained unanswered. The Illinois court in
the instant case resolved that question on the theory that the same
philosophy underlies this case as in fact underlies jurisdiction over the
non-resident motorist and the non-resident seller of securities and that.
legislation may be constitutionally directed to the fact of injury as well
as to the probability of injury from a particular instrumentality or busi-
ness. The social problems resulting from the latter may be of greater
magnitude than those of tortious conduct generally but the court felt
that the need for such a distinction was peculiarly a problem for the
legislature.
The application of the rule of the International Shoe case to the
controlling circumstances of the principal case would certainly justify
the result. Here the defendant had voluntarily sent his agent into the
state where he enjoyed the benefit and protection of Illinois law. He
inflicted an injury which would be witnessed by Illinois residents and to
which Illinois substantive law would be applicable. In balancing such
factors against insubstantial claims of inconvenience to the defendant,
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11 The court in the International Shoe case said "that clause does not con-
template that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relation." (Emphasis added.) Supra note 10.
12LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §13: 3479 (1950) upheld in Goltzman v. Rougeot,
122 F. Supp. 700 (D. La. 1954). See also Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd. 127 F. Supp.
945 (1954).
13 McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union, 254 SAV.2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1952);
Quinn v. Pershing, 367 Pa. 426, 80 A.2d 712 (1951).
14 VT. REV. STAT. §1562 (1947) upheld in Smyth v. Twin State Improvements
Corp. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
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the assertion of jurisdiction did not violate the "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Indeed, this new due process standard
will facilitate justice for individual claimants who, under the old stand-
ard, could not afford a foreign trial to recover small sums, thus enabling
the defendant to avoid litigation if service upon him were not obtained
within the claimant's home state. This new standard reduces the appli-
cability of the standard established by Pennoyer v. Neff which based
jurisdiction solely on service of process within the jurisdiction of the
forum regardless of the inconvenience to the defendant or the extent of
his contacts with that forum. 5 It offers as a basis for due process, not
chance service but the more rational basis of forum conveniens.
There appears to be no precise formula for determining juris-
dictional validity under the due process principles established by the
International Shoe case. This determination, it seems clear, must be
made in case to case adjudication upon the peculiar circumstances sur-
rounding each case and what is fair and reasonable under such circum-
stances.1" These determining factors should include as relevant the
nature and extent of the defendant's activity within the state in relation
to the claimant's injury, considering the state's obligation to protect its
citizens and to establish the fair and orderly administration of its law.1 7
Indeed, to establish any concrete formula for such an elusive concept as
"fair play and substantial justice" would result in precluding its purpose
prior to actual application.
Richard A. Stebelton
15 The rule in Pennoyer v Neff has been often criticized. Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Po'wer" Myth and Forum Con-
veniens, 64- YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
16Jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was allowed where the cause of
action arose from outside the state because its activities within the state made
jurisdiction fair and reasonable. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952). A further treatment may be found in Cleary & Seder, Ex-
tended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 N.W.U.L. REV. 599 (1955).
17 A recent Supreme Court decision upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration in an action arising out of an insurance policy issued to the plaintiff's son
where that policy was the extent of the defendant's business and activity in
California.'International Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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